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Abstract
This paper introduces two new datasets. The first is a new in-
terstate distance dataset. It is recognised that different theories re-
garding distance and conflict will call for different understandings of
‘distance’ and accordingly, ten different types of distance measure-
ment are presented. Moreover, it is argued that in order for a dis-
tance dataset to contain accurate distances, it is necessary for it to be
based on maps reflecting state border changes over time. As such,
a new map dataset is presented, including annualised maps for all
states, stored in KML format. It will be shown that the frequent border
changes experienced by states can have large impacts on distance
calculations. The significance of the relationship between distance
and conflict will be tested for the ten different types of distance mea-
surement, not with the aim of finding a ‘best measure’ but in order
to demonstrate that distance remains an important variable and that
each different form of distance measure can be significant.
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Introduction
It has long been recognised that there is a relationship between distance
and conflict. This paper introduces two new datasets to better understand
this relationship. The first dataset presents ten different measures of in-
terstate distance for all states between the years 1946–2010. The second
dataset includes new maps of all states on an annual basis over the same
temporal domain, reflecting state border changes which have occurred.
There are three main reasons for introducing these new datasets. First,
much existing research on distance and conflict has had to depend on hy-
bridised data which presents methodological problems. Second, existing
distance measures have been based on the assumption that state borders
remain constant over time. Finally, by presenting new forms of distance
measure, this paper aims to give conflict researchers new tools. This pa-
per does not aim to find a single measure of distance which is the ‘best’
measure for conflict researchers to use. Instead, it aims to give conflict
researchers new measures which may better fit their existing hypotheses.
Why distance is relevant to conflict
The extensive literature linking distance with conflict can be reduced to
three analogies: boxers, neighbours and boils. Boxers cannot fight unless
they can reach each other (Bremer 1992: 312); next-door neighbours are
more likely to quarrel than those separated by several houses (Wesley
1962: 387); a boil on your neck is more worrying than famine in China
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Figure 1: Simple form of the Loss of Strength Gradient (LSG). From Bould-
ing (1962, Fig. 12.2: 232)
(Zipf 1949: 391). As well as three analogies, much of the distance-conflict
literature depends on two frameworks: the loss of strength gradient, plus
the opportunity and willingness framework.
The loss of strength gradient
Kenneth Boulding (1962) developed one of the most useful tools to under-
stand distance decay: the loss of strength gradient (LSG). This is a law of
diminishing strength, summed up in four words as, ‘the further, the weaker’
(Boulding 1962: 231). A state’s strength1 is at its greatest within its own
borders (the ‘maximum home strength’); that strength diminishes as the
distance from those borders increases. The area over which a state has a
predominance of strength is known as its ‘sphere of influence.’
To represent this idea visually, Boulding creates a series of diagrams
of increasing complexity. One of the more straightforward diagrams is pre-
sented in Figure 1.
1Boulding (1962: 230) concedes that the creation of a strength variable is difficult, but
felt it was possible; however, by 1989, he had decided that the creation of what he now
referred to as a ‘power’ variable was ‘virtually impossible’ (Boulding 1989: 192).
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A and B represent states. Points H and K denote the strength of states
A and B at home respectively. The further up the page, the greater the
level of strength. Thus, the strength of state A at home (represented by
point H) is greater than that of state B at home, represented by point K. As
strength is represented on the vertical axis, so distance is represented on
the horizontal axis. As the distance from state A increases, the diagonal
line falls further down the vertical axis, indicating a loss of strength. In this
diagram, the strength of state A is always greater than that of state B, even
at the point at which B experiences its maximum home strength: within its
own borders. To use Boulding’s terminology, state B is not unconditionally
viable.
Opportunity and willingness
Another useful way in which to conceptualise the importance of distance
is Harvey Starr’s opportunity and willingness framework (Starr and Most
1976; Starr 1978) which has been used to inform ideas such as the po-
litically relevant international environment (PRIE, see Maoz 2000) or po-
litically relevant neighbourhoods (see Tammen et al. 2000). Akin to the
classic principles of ‘means, motive and opportunity’ presented in detec-
tive fiction,2 Starr looks at whether states are physically able to reach each
other and whether they want to reach each other, in terms of positive or
negative interactions. These principles can also be applied on a sub-state
2These methods are most relevant when considering the fact that so much of the
distance/ conflict literature makes reference to Svalastoga’s 1956 finding that murders
tend to be committed by murderers known to the victim; a similar observation is made in
Richardson 1960: 288)
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basis. In some cases, willingness is more important than opportunity (see,
for instance, Tinbergen’s 1965 observation that the UK would often allow
Commonwealth ties to determine its trade flows, rather than distance).
Nevertheless, the physical opportunities for actors to interact are an im-
portant factor to consider when analysing conflict.
The reasons for a new distance dataset
Two of the most widely used means of quantifying distance are inter-capital
and minimum distance. Garnham (1976) concluded that interstate war
was more probable between more proximate pairs of states. However, he
recognised that one of the shortcomings of his analysis was that the dis-
tance between states was measured by the distance between the capital
cities of the two states. A clear example of a problem facing Garnham’s
analysis is that of the Mexican-American War of 1846: the distance be-
tween the capitals of the two states is approximately 3,000 kilometres, yet
this fails to take into account that the states in this dyad share a large land
boundary. As such, Garnham states that it would have been preferable to
perform the analysis using distance measurements based on the point of
closest geographical proximity. However, this would require access to a
large number of accurate maps.
Answering this call are Gleditsch and Ward (2001). They developed
the first minimum distance database. This was a great move forward in
the availability of distance data: now, a comprehensive dataset would be
available providing the researcher with highly detailed information. How-
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ever, due to a lack of resources such as expensive GIS software, they
had to take a visual approach to their distance analysis, rather than de-
veloping a software system that would perform the calculations for them.
This meant that some compromises needed to be made, such as exclud-
ing state dyads separated by more than 950 kilometres or states with a
population of less than 250,000. As a result of this, only seven per cent
of potential dyads are included in the dataset. Furthermore, the maps
used in the Gleditsch-Ward dataset did not take into account changes to
state boundaries, some of which can have a significant impact on distance
measurements.
The dataset presented by this paper, then, covers all state dyads be-
tween the years 1946 and 2010, irrespective of size or distance, reflecting
changes to state borders. As the borders of states change over time, the
distances between states will vary. Also, state dyads can gain or lose con-
tiguity over time. In order to measure the distance between states, maps
have to be created of those states. One of the many issues which arises
in doing this is that the number of states in existence varies over time.
The formalisation of Westphalia
In order to make the datasets presented by this paper as compatible as
possible with existing research, the list of states in existence for each year
was based on the lists maintained by the Correlates of War Project (COW
2008). The temporal domain of the project is 1946–2010 and as such,
the period of decolonisation is covered. This presents a challenge: be-
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fore decolonisation, should the colonies be considered as part of the ter-
ritory of their colonising state? This is the perspective taken by Fearon
and Laitin (2003): wars of independence from empires are civil conflicts
within the imperial state. A potential issue with the Fearon and Laitin ap-
proach is the fact that different states had different colonising practices.
In the post-colonial era, different practices can still be found. The French
DOM-TOMs (de´partements et territoires d’outre mer) offer the greatest de-
gree of institutional clarity: the DOMs are legally part of the French state
(as affirmed by the French High Court: see Muller 1999: 48; Aldrich and
Connell 1992: 284); the TOMs are not. Should this paper, then, take the
perspective of Fearon and Laitin (2003) by considering DOMs to be a part
of the territorial state of France? Taking this approach would present two
problems: i) other colonising states do not provide the same degree of
institutional clarity that France does regarding the DOM-TOMs;3 ii) if all of
the islands, territories, departments, protectorates, administrations, mili-
tary bases, etc., of states are included as part of the territory of a state,
the resulting distance dataset would be rendered meaningless. Because
of French Guiana, France would be literally contiguous with Suriname and
Brazil and as such, theoretical arguments regarding a loss-of-strength gra-
dient or interaction opportunities would be worthless.
3An obvious case here is the Falklands/ Malvinas. This is important for students of
conflict and proximity because of the distances involved. This perhaps goes some way to
explaining why, as Suganami (1996: 70) observes, a strict interpretation of Correlates of
War rules would exclude this conflict from the COW dataset, due to there being between
910 - 950 battle deaths (below the COW threshold of 1000). The inclusion of the conflict
in the COW dataset is to some extent a fudge; similarly, including the islands as part
of the territorial state of the UK would also require a fudge, as residents are afforded
considerably less rights than residents of the French DOMs.
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As such, the concept of the metropole is employed. Generally speak-
ing, the mainland will be considered to compose the territory of a state
in question. This does not mean that all islands will be excluded; in-
deed, this would be impossible with archipelago states such as Indonesia.
But the more distant possessions of states, however legally bound to the
metropole they may be, will not be considered part of the state by this pa-
per.4 Distant military bases will not be considered to be part of the state
(although this does present future research possibilities). In the case of
especially large territories which are at great distance from the metropole
(such as French Guiana, or Greenland from Denmark), a separate special
case has been allocated which will allow researchers to redefine state ter-
ritory if their methodology requires it. The complete list of special cases for
which maps have been created and distance measures included is as fol-
lows: Alaska, Falkland Islands/ Islas Malvinas, French Guiana, the Gaza
Strip, Greenland, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the contiguous 48 United States,
the West Bank and Western Sahara.
As the map and distance datasets presented by this paper are based
on the annual state lists developed by COW, employing the methodology
discussed above means that the state map of the world for 1946 would be
quite different from the same map for 2010, as can be seen in Figure 2.
Essentially, the 1946 image presents the world at the end of its imperial
phase; in keeping with the methodology discussed above, the white parts
4A notable exception is Hawaii. As researchers may require different understandings
of the territory of the United States, several versions are included in the dataset. The
standard version includes all 50 states, but there are also variants which record distance
measures for the contiguous 48, Hawaii, Alaska and finally Puerto Rico separately).
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Figure 2: State and non-state territory: the spread of Westphalia, 1946 to
2010
9
are non-state territory. By 1946, most of the world is black; the white area
becomes increasingly diminished as time progresses.
Changes to state boundaries included in the dataset
The maps created for this article used four chief sources describing terri-
torial conflicts as a starting point: Tir et al. (1998); Huth and Allee (2002);
Kocs (1995); and Kornprobst (2002). In each case where the conflict may
have resulted in a change to the status quo, additional state-specific texts
were consulted, along with border agreements (if available) and hundreds
of maps. An example is presented in Figure 3, which represents the bor-
der changes to Yugoslavia.5 The first three maps of Yugoslavia show its
incorporation of the Istrian peninsula and Zone A of the ‘Julian’ region;
the 1946-1947 map depends on the 1920 Rapallo line (see Novak 1970;
Duroselle 1966), while the second and third maps move the borders west,
expanding Yugoslav territory. Yugoslavia also gains territory from Hun-
gary at the same time (see Brubaker et al. 2006). However, the last four
maps show the break-up of Yugoslavia: the fourth map showing the loss of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia; the fifth showing the sep-
aration of Macedonia; the sixth, Montenegro; finally the seventh, Kosovo.
5The latest version of the COW state system membership list was released on June
23, 2008. For the year 2008, COW recognises a state known as Yugoslavia with the three
letter codename, YUG. This is despite the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ceased to exist on February 4, 2003, replaced on that date by the Union of Serbia and
Montenegro (the state later dividing into two separate states, Montenegro on June 3,
2006, and Serbia on June 5, 2006). For the current COW membership list, then, from
2007 onwards, Serbia, which does not appear on the list, must be considered to represent
Yugoslavia. This will hopefully be modified in future versions of the state list. For the maps
associated with this article, then, a state known as Yugoslavia will exist in 2010. In reality,
it will be what is now known as Serbia.
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Figure 3: Border changes to Yugoslavia, 1946-2010
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Figure 4: Changes to the border of India
Minor border changes
While the map dataset exists in isolation from the distance dataset, it
should be pointed out that the maps were created in order to create the
new distance dataset. As such, the maps aim to capture as many changes
to state borders as possible. Some of these changes were very small
and will result in extremely minor changes to the distance dataset (see for
instance the case of India in Figure 4, where India gains possession of
Daman and Goa from Portugal). A very few changes were too small to be
reflected in the maps at all, such as Pakistan gaining control of the small
port city of Gwadar from Oman. An even smaller number of cases were
excluded because they would not involve a change to an outward facing
border and would therefore have no impact on distance measurements,
such as the transfer of control of the inland city of Chandernagore from
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France to India (colonial city possessions tended to be coastal).
Changing country shape
Some border changes resulted in alteration of the overall ‘shape of the
country,’ but again resulted in an only limited alteration to the distance
measurements. The six maps of Saudi Arabia in Figure 5 provide an ex-
ample here: as the spread of Westphalia becomes more formalised in
Saudi Arabia and surrounding states, the lines in the sand are drawn ever-
more fixedly, but this does not result in significant changes to the distance
dataset. The changing border between Hungary and Romania provides a
similar example. While Hungary loses a significant amount of territory to
Romania (territory which had extended as far as the Szekler region) and
at the same time loses territory to what are now the Ukraine, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, these border changes still have little impact
on the distance dataset.
Substantial changes
However, other border changes result in more substantial changes, such
as Malaysia and Indonesia, presented in Figure 6. For Malaysia,6 we see
the union of Malaya with Sabah, Sarawak and (temporarily) Singapore.
For Indonesia, we see the incorporation of West Papua (Netherlands New
Guinea). These both result in significant changes to the distance dataset.
Similar cases include Japan’s repossession of the Okinawa prefecture (the
6COW recognises a state known as Malaysia as existing from the year 1957 onwards,
whereas in reality it should be Malaya from 1957–1963.
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Figure 5: Country shape: changes to the borders of Saudi Arabia, Hungary
and Romania
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Figure 6: Changes to the territory of Malaysia and Indonesia
Ryukyu archipelago), Egypt’s temporary union with Syria and Canada’s
gaining of Newfoundland.
Ten different measures of interstate distance
Lemke argues that ‘researchers should specify reasons for the definition
of distance they select’ (Lemke 1995: 34). The distance dataset presented
by this paper provides ten different measures of interstate distance which
will be explained with reference to Figure 7. Minimum distance has be-
come one of the most widely used measures of proximity in conflict re-
search, as its advantages are fairly clear. Gleditsch and Ward (2001) com-
pare minimum distance with intercapital distance: ‘The sizeable distance
between Washington, DC, and Mexico City clearly understates the long
shared border between the USA and Mexico. ... The main advantage of
15
Figure 7: Ten measures of distance between Iran and Iraq. 2010 map and
distance data used.
the minimum-distance database is that it can be used to derive continuous
data on distances as well as to generate binary or categorized contiguity
data’ (Gleditsch and Ward 2001: 744-7). Lemke (1995), however, uses
intercapital distance as it
makes distances between countries symmetric... Of course,
inter-capital distance is a debatable choice as well, and those
dissatisfied with it can use whatever definition of distance they
choose... I select inter-capital distance on the assumption that
capital cities generally approximate where attacks arise from,
and where they are targeted. Further, inter-capital distance is
symmetric, making it equally difficult for each dyad member to
attack the other (Lemke 1995: 26; footnote 6: 34).
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Figure 7 presents minimum distance as ‘A’ (which for contiguous dyads7
such as Iran and Iraq is 0) and intercapital distance as ‘B.’ Lemke’s as-
sumption of symmetry is surprising, however. Earlier works do not take
the perspective that attacks start and end in capital cities. Bueno de
Mesquita (1981) looks at ‘the distance between a nation’s seat of power
and the place where its power must be brought to bear in a war’ (Bueno
de Mesquita 1981: 83); similarly, de Vree (1982) argues that
the distance from i to j may well be greater than that from
j to i. For instance, a good strategic position is characterized
precisely by the fact that those who occupy it can reach those
who attack it much more easily and successfully that the other
way around (de Vree 1982: 122).
A useful, if imperfect, proxy for Bueno de Mesquita’s ‘seat of power’
could be the capital city of the first state, while the place where the ‘power
must be brought to bear’ could be proxied in some instances as the clos-
est point on the opposing state border. The inverse of this could also be
appropriate: the ‘War of the Cities’ phase of the Iran-Iraq war saw arma-
ments massed at points on the border closest to the capital city in order
to launch attacks covering the least possible distance (McNaugher 1987;
Chubin 1989; Hiro 1990). As such, non-symmetric measures of distance
suggested above by de Vree are also included in the distance dataset.
Line ‘C’ shows the distance from Tehran to the Iraqi border, while line ‘D’
7In such cases, researchers might want to consider employing a measure of border
length: see for instance Furlong and Gleditsch (2003), plus the pioneering work of Lewis
Fry Richardson (1960, 1961) and Benoit Mandelbrot (1967))
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shows the distance from Baghdad to the Iranian border. Line ‘E’ gives
the opposite to minimum distance: the maximum distance between two
states. While some dyads may be relatively close at the point of minimum
distance, much of the territory of the two states may in reality be quite far
apart. This can be more of an issue for archipelago or strangely-shaped
states: the maximum distance from Micronesia to Indonesia, for instance,
is four times greater than the minimum distance. Lines ‘F’ and ‘G’ give
the non-symmetric capital-based counterparts to maximum distance: the
maximum distance from Tehran to any point on the border of Iraq and the
equivalent for Baghdad. Finally, ‘H,’ ‘I’ and ‘J’ (not represented as lines)
give the simple mean average of the Iran-Iraq dyad, the Tehran-Iraq dyad
and the Baghdad-Iran dyad.
Again, it is not the argument of this paper that one measure of distance
is inherently superior to others. Instead, this paper argues that conflict
researchers should let the measure fit the hypothesis. The data analysis
section below shows that the different measures presented above can form
useful proxies for existing hypotheses.
Data analysis
The different forms of distance measure can now be tested to see if they
are significantly related to conflict.
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Analysis based on Maoz’ data
The first application of the distance data to conflict data is based on Zeev
Maoz’ (2005) dyadic data. The temporal domain of Maoz’ data is 1816–
2001. Distance data items for this project have been generated for 1946–
2010; as such, this analysis will be restricted to 1946–2001. This yields
553,274 non-directed dyad-years, 294 of which are war dyad-years, the
unit of analysis in this case (a year in which war occurred: an on-going
dispute can occur in several years).
Table 1 presents the results of logit regression tests on five different
measures of distance. Models 1 and 2 present the already-existing forms
of distance measure: intercapital and the Gleditsch-Ward hybrid.8 The
significant relationship between conflict and these two existing measures
of distance is fairly well established (see for instance Buhaug and Gled-
itsch 2006); the results of these models are included here for comparison.
Models 3, 4 and 5 are based on three of the new distance measures:
minimum, maximum and mean average distance. The distance measures
used in these three models are also found to have a strongly significant
relationship, suggesting that these three measures may also be of use to
the conflict researcher.
However, as has been discussed above, the distance dataset pre-
sented by this article also includes non-symmetrical forms of distance
measure. Models for these could not be tested in Table 1 as the regres-
8As the Gleditsch-Ward minimum distance dataset includes distance measures for
states separated by less than 950km, it is fairly common in distance-conflict literature to
compile hybrid datasets of minimum distance and intercapital distance, using intercapital
data to ‘fill in the gaps.’
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Table 1: Logit regressions of distance, Maoz’ dyadic conflict data, using
non-directed dyads
Model Description Incidence Intercept
1 Intercapital -0.0001946*** -6.3572229***
(0.00001737) (0.10060000)
2 Gleditsch-Ward min-dist/ -0.0002024*** -6.3597244***
intercapital hybrid (0.00001662) (0.09234000)
3 Minimum distance -0.0003099*** -6.1507492***
(0.00002185) (0.08537000)
4 Maximum distance -0.0001485*** -6.4458098***
(0.00001559) (0.11240000)
5 Average distance -0.0002227*** -6.2138928***
(0.00001835) (0.10120000)
N=553,274.
sions presented were based on non-directed dyadic data. The minimum-
capital distance measure does not suit itself well to non-directed dyadic
data, as the variable is inherently directed. As such, Table 2 reperforms
the regressions, based on directed dyadic data.9 The first five models in
the table follow the example set in Table 1, while models 6 and 7 present
regressions of non-symmetrical, directed distance.
Model 6 can be understood as a proxy for a theory developed by Bueno
de Mesquita (1981). As was mentioned earlier, he looked at the distance
between a state’s seat of power, and the place where that power must be
used, which he in turn proxied by the locus of power of state A and the
minimum distance to state B. Model 6, then, should provide a reasonable
9To do this, the Maoz dataset, based on Correlates of War data, was converted to a
format more similar to the Uppsala/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Put simply, each line
item in Maoz’ dataset has variables for state A, state B, plus whether state A was on side
A or whether state B was on side A. The ACD avoids this issue by listing states as part of
side A or side B variables.
20
Table 2: Logit regressions of distance, Maoz’ dyadic conflict data, using
directed dyads
Model Description Incidence Intercept
1 Intercapital -0.0003611*** -3.6945657***
(0.00000553) (0.02267000)
2 Minimum distance -0.0005818*** -3.5631556***
(0.00000835) (0.01929000)
3 Gleditsch-Ward min-dist/ -0.000424*** -3.637321***
intercapital hybrid (0.00000580) (0.01953000)
4 Maximum distance -0.0002221*** -4.0093561***
(0.00000425) (0.02618000)
5 Average distance -0.000355*** -3.681874***
(0.00000557) (0.02354000)
6 Capital to minimum -0.0004477*** -3.6195813***
state edge (0.00000658) (0.02113000)
7 Minimum state -0.0004477*** -3.6195781***
edge to capital (0.00000658) (0.02113000)
N=1,228,892.
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proxy for Bueno de Mesquita’s theory (although it is recognised that the
capital city may not be the locus of power). Model 7, on the other hand,
works from the opposite assumption: it takes the perspective that attacks
will arise from the edge of a potential attacker, and culminate at the capital
of the intended victim. Returning to an earlier point, Lemke decided to
use intercapital data, as he felt that attacks tend to arise in capitals and
are aimed at other capitals. This is a curious assumption to make. Some
conflicts do have the opponent’s capital city as the target (such as the War
of the Cities, discussed earlier). But it seems less reasonable to assume
that an attack on a capital city would arise from a capital city; it would make
more sense for attacks to arise10 from the territory of state A closest to that
of state B: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in which Kuwait City was taken by
troops which had been stationed on the border (Niva 1991: 55-6; Mylroie
1996: 45-8) and the Soviet attack on Budapest in 1956 (Me´ray 1959: 237)
provide examples of this.11
All of the distance measures presented in this section have been shown
to have a significant relationship with conflict. As was stated earlier, it is not
the aim of this paper to find a single ‘best’ measure of distance for conflict
10Part of the difficulty here is in defining ‘arise.’ A capital city may well have more
troops garrisoned than other parts of the state, due in part to the fact that it may be one
of the largest population centres. Where, then, are the troops embarking from? Does an
attack ‘arise’ when armed forces leave state A bound for state B, when the army barracks
is first built, or at some time in between? Determining where armed forces came from
depends in great part on when we start looking. When considering the logistics of the
global political chessboard on which the armed forces of the United States operate, this
is a tremendously complicated issue.
11The US’ involvement in Korea goes a step further: troops were already stationed
outside of the US. The day after President Truman committed ground forces to the Korean
conflict, US troops started moving from Japan to Korea. See Paul 1973; Landsdown
2006; Marolda 2007.
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researchers. Rather, the aim is to give researchers tools which may better
fit their hypotheses. The distance measure used in Model 7, for instance,
shows that researchers following the example of Lemke’s relevant dyads
could consider minimum state edge to capital data as an alternative to
intercapital data.
Analysis based on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s data
Buhaug and Gleditsch (2006) also looked at the relationship between dis-
tance and conflict. They performed a multivariate regression using vari-
ables such as alliances, major powers and democracies.
Table 3 reproduces their analysis on the more limited timeframe of
1946–1998. The ‘a’ models are based on non-war MIDs, the ‘b’ models
are wars, while the ‘c’ models are wars and non-war MIDs combined. The
Gleditsch-Ward 950km minimum/ intercapital distance hybrid is tested (the
measure used in Buhaug and Gleditsch 2006), along with natural logged
versions of the new minimum, average and maximum distance. As was the
case in the earlier analysis of Maoz’ data, all of the distance measures are
found to have a significant relationship with conflict. This suggests that re-
searchers could consider using alternative distance measures when their
hypotheses call for them.
Interesting results are found when looking at the probability data pre-
sented by Buhaug and Gleditsch. They observe that ‘[a]ccording to Model
1, two states separated by the 5th percentile value (412 km) are more
than three times as likely to be in a dispute as a dyad with the 95th per-
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Figure 8: Relative probability of MID (including war) at distance per-
centiles.
1946–1998 data.
centile value (15,835 km).’ Table 4 uses Model 1 and tests conflict prob-
ability based on five different forms of distance measurement. Figure 8
presents the probabilities at several different distance percentiles. The
distance measure with the greatest probability differences is average dis-
tance: states separated by a 5th percentile mean average distance are al-
most 33 times more likely to be engaged in conflict than states separated
by the 95th percentile mean average distance. Intercapital and maximum
distance also show strong differences. This is important, as researchers
using a hybrid of minimum and intercapital distance should be aware that
separately, the two distance measures yield very different conflict proba-
bilities.
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Conclusion
While the overall relationship between distance and conflict has been fairly
well understood for some time, an element of doubt has remained. Existing
datasets have been incomplete (limited to state dyads separated by 950km
or less), inconsistent (based on hybridised minimum and intercapital data,
two forms of distance measure which, as this article has shown, yield very
different probability results), and based on non-contemporaneous maps.
As was pointed out earlier, Lemke argues that ‘researchers should spec-
ify reasons for the definition of distance they select’ (Lemke 1995: 34).
It may be the case that intercapital distance is better for understanding
cultural similarities and ties, whereas minimum distance is of more use in
explaining trade or tourism. The distance dataset presented by this article
presents eight new measures for the researcher to consider.
Since the height of the Cold War, researchers have been arguing that
distance is no longer a factor in conflict research. Yet Buhaug and Gled-
itsch (2006: 198) made the case that the death of distance has ‘probably
been prematurely announced.’ This article agrees with their finding. There
are still areas of research in distance and conflict which still need to be
explored. The impact of distance on interaction opportunities is most im-
portant and new research on overseas military bases and the relative size
and location of states should yield useful new findings. The importance
of distance to civil conflict has only been acknowledged relatively recently
and in this area too there is much ground to cover. It is hoped that the new
distance datasets presented by this article will be of use to researchers,
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whether they are looking at distance and conflict directly, or using distance
as a control variable. It is also hoped that the new set of maps presented
by this paper will also be of use to researchers.
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Table 4: Probability of MIDs comparing 5th with 95th distance percentiles,
based on different measures of distance
5th percentile 95th percentile Probability
(km) (km)
Gleditsch-Ward 552 15987 4.223781
950km hybrid
Minimum 507 14847 4.740327
distance
Maximum 2083 17155 19.74926
distance
Intercapital 1297 15987 23.82902
distance
Average 1411 15928 32.90504
distance
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